# 1NC

### First Off

**Their bourgeois cultural criticism denies us the ability to challenge ruling class oppression on the basis of its objectivity, by focusing on solely situated knowledge**

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The unsurpassable objectivity which is not open to rhetorical interpretation and constitutes the decided foundation of critique is the "outside" that Marx calls the "Working Day" (Capital 1: 340-416). ([France] willfully misrecognizes my notion of objectivity by confusing my discussion of identity politics and objectivity.) The working day is not what it seems: its reality, like the reality of all capitalist practices, is an alienated reality--there is a contradiction between its appearance and its essence. It "appears" as if the worker, during the working day, receives wages that are equal compensation for his labor. This mystification originates in the fact that the capitalist pays not for "labor" but for "labor power": when labor power is put to use it produces more than it is paid for. The "working day" is the site of the unfolding of this fundamental contradiction: it is a divided day, divided into "necessary labor"--the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages--and the "other," the part of "surplus labor"--a part in which the worker works for free and produces "surplus value." The second part of the working day is the source of profit and accumulation of capital. "Surplus labor" is the OBJECTIVE FACT of capitalist relations of production: without "surplus labor" there will be no profit, and without profit there will be no accumulation of capital, and without accumulation of capital there will be no capitalism. The goal of bourgeois economics is to conceal this part of the working day, and it should therefore be no surprise that, as a protector of ruling class interests in the academy, [Hill], with a studied casualness, places "surplus value" in the adjacency of "radical bible-studies" and quietly turns it into a rather boring matter of interest perhaps only to the dogmatic. To be more concise: "surplus labor" is that objective, unsurpassable "outside" that cannot be made part of the economies of the "inside" without capitalism itself being transformed into socialism. Revolutionary critique is grounded in this truth--objectivity--since all social institutions and practices of capitalism are founded upon the objectivity of surplus labor. The role of a revolutionary pedagogy of critique is to produce class consciousness so as to assist in organizing people into a new vanguard party that aims at abolishing this FACT of the capitalist system and transforming capitalism into a communist society. As I have argued in my "Postality" [Transformation 1], (post)structuralist theory, through the concept of "representation," makes all such facts an effect of interpretation and turns them into "undecidable" processes. The boom in ludic theory and Rhetoric Studies in the bourgeois academy is caused by the service it renders the ruling class: it makes the OBJECTIVE reality of the extraction of surplus labor a subjective one--not a decided fact but a matter of "interpretation." In doing so, it "deconstructs" (see the writings of such bourgeois readers as Gayatri Spivak, Cornel West, and Donna Haraway) the labor theory of value, displaces production with consumption, and resituates the citizen from the revolutionary cell to the ludic shopping mall of [France]. Now that I have indicated the objective grounds of "critique," I want to go back to the erasure of critique by dialogue in the post-al left and examine the reasons why these nine texts locate my critique-al writings and pedagogy in the space of violence, Stalinism, and demagoguery. Violence, in the post-al left, is a refusal to "talk." "To whom is Zavarzadeh speaking?" asks [ Williams], who regards my practices to he demagogical, and [ Bernard-Donals] finds as a mark of violence in my texts that "The interlocutor really is absent" from them. What is obscured in this representation of the non-dialogical is, of course, the violence of the dialogical. I leave aside here the violence with which these advocates of non-violent conversations attack me in their texts, and cartoon. My concern is with the practices by which the post-al left, through dialogue, naturalizes (and eroticizes) the violence that keeps capitalist democracy in power. What is violent? Subjecting people to the daily terrorism of layoffs in order to maintain high rates of profit for the owners of the means of production or redirecting this violence (which gives annual bonuses, in addition to multi-million-dollar salaries, benefits, and stock options, to the CEOs of the very corporations that are laying off thousands of workers) against the ruling class in order to end class societies? What is violent? Keeping millions of people in poverty, hunger, starvation, and homelessness, and deprived of basic health care, at a time when the forces of production have reached a level that can, in fact, provide for the needs of all people, or trying to overthrow this system? What is violent? Placing in office, under the alibi of "free elections," postfascists (Italy) and allies of the ruling class (Major, Clinton, Kohl, Yeltsin) or struggling to end this farce? What is violent? Reinforcing these practices by "talking" about them in a "reasonable" fashion (that is, within the rules of the game established by the ruling class for limited reform from "within") or marking the violence of conversation and its complicity with the status quo, thereby breaking the frame that represents "dialogue" as participation, when in fact it is merely a formal strategy for legitimating the established order? Any society in which the labor of many is the source of wealth for the few--all class societies--is a society of violence, and no amount of "talking" is going to change that objective fact. "Dialogue" and "conversation" are aimed at arriv-ing at a consensus by which this violence is made more tolerable, justifiable, and naturalized.

Capitalism causes extinction

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[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that **capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control**. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. **This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet.** The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Our alternative is to engage in a radical socialist reimagination of politics by adopting a historical materialist perspective. Historical materialism is the best methodological approach to fighting capitalism – it provides the ideological backdrop necessary to turn theory into praxis and end capitalist exploitation.

Lukacs 67 (George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness)

Historical materialism has, therefore, a much greater value for the proletariat than that of a method of historical research. It is one of the most important of all its weapons. For the class struggle of the proletariat signifies at the same time the awakening of its class consciousness. And this awakening followed everywhere from an understanding of the true situation, of the actually existing historical connections. And it is this that gives the class struggle of the proletariat its special place among other class struggles, namely that it obtains its sharpest weapon from the hand of true science, from its clear insight into reality. Whereas in the class struggles of the past the most varied ideologies, religious, moral and other forms of 'false consciousness' were decisive, in the case of the class struggle of the proletariat, the war for the liberation of the last oppressed class, the revelation of the unvarnished truth became both a war-cry and the most potent weapon. By laying bare the springs of the historical process historical materialism became, in consequence of the class situation of the proletariat, an instrument of war. The most important function of historical materialism is to deliver a precise judgement on the capitalist social system, to unmask capitalist society. Throughout the class struggle of the proletariat, therefore, historical materialism has constantly been used at every point, where, by means of all sorts of ideological frills, the bourgeoisie had concealed the true situation, the state of the class struggle; it has been used to focus the cold rays of science upon these veils and to show how false and misleading they were and how far they were in conflict with the truth. For this reason the chief function of historical materialism did not lie in the elucidation of pure scientific knowledge, but in the field of action. Historical materialism did not exist for its own sake, it existed so that the proletariat could understand a situation and so that, armed with this knowledge, it could act accordingly.

The affirmative’s claims of radical resistance are nothing more than interpassivity in the face of capitalism – their energetic promotion of an ideal critical theory serves as an ideological screen to allow the logic of capital to remain unchallenged.

Zizek 02—Professor of Philosophy @ Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana [Slavoj, “Revolution at the Gates”, pg 167-172]

The problem lies in the further implicit qualifications which can easily be discerned by a “concrete analysis of the concrete situation”, as Lenin himself would have put it. “Fidelity to the democratic consensus” means acceptance of the present liberal-parliamentary consensus, which precludes any serious questioning of the way this liberal-democratic order is complicit in the phenomena it officially condemns, and, of course, any serious attempt to imagine a different sociopolitical order. In short, it means: say and write whatever you like — on condition that you do not actually question or disturb the prevailing political consensus. Everything is allowed, solicited even, as a critical topic: the prospect of a global ecological catastrophe; violations of human rights; sexism, homophobia, anti-feminism; growing violence not only in faraway countries, but also in our own megalopolises; the gap between the First and the Third World, between rich and poor; the shattering impact of the digitalization of our daily lives ... today, there is nothing easier than to get international, state or corporate funds for a multidisciplinary research project on how to fight new forms of ethnic, religious or sexist violence. The problem is that all this occurs against the background of a fundamental Denkverbot: a prohibition on thinking. Today’s liberal-democratic hegemony is sustained by a kind of unwritten Denkverbot similar to the infamous Berufsverbot (prohibition on employing individuals with radical Left leanings in the state organs) in Germany in the late 1960s — the moment we show a minimal sign of engaging in political projects which aim seriously to challenge the existing order, the answer is immediately: “Benevolent as it is, this will inevitably end in a new Gulag!” The ideological function of constant references to the Holocaust, the Gulag, and more recent Third World catastrophes is thus to serve as the support of this Denkverbot by constantly reminding us how things could have been much worse: “Just look around and see for yourself what will happen if we follow your radical notions!” What we encounter here is the ultimate example of what Anna Dinerstein and Mike Neary have called the project of disutopia: “not just the temporary absence of Utopia, but the political celebration of the end of social dreams”.2 And the demand for “scientific objectivity” amounts to just another version of the same Denkverhot: the moment we seriously question the existing liberal consensus, we are accused of abandoning scientific objectivity for outdated ideological positions. This is the “Leninist” point on which one cannot and should not concede: today, actual freedom of thought means freedom to question the prevailing liberal-democratic “post-ideological” consensus — or it means nothing. The Right to Truth The perspective of the critique of ideology compels us to invert Wittgenstein’s “What one cannot speak about, thereof one should be silent” into “What one should not speak about, thereof one cannot remain silent”. If you want to speak about a social system, you cannot remain silent about its repressed excess. The point is not to tell the whole Truth but, precisely, to append to the (official) Whole the uneasy supplement which denounces its falsity. As Max Horkheimer put it back in the l930s: “If you don’t want to talk about capitalism, then you should keep silent about Fascism.” Fascism is the inherent “symptom” (the return of the repressed) of capitalism, the key to its “truth”, not just an external contingent deviation of its “normal” logic. And the same goes for today’s situation: those who do not want to subject liberal democracy and the flaws of its multiculturalist tolerance to critical analysis, should keep quiet about the new Rightist violence and intolerance. If we are to leave the opposition between liberal-democratic universalism and ethnic/religious fundamentalism behind, the first step is to acknowledge the existence of liberal fundamentalism: the perverse game of making a big fuss when the rights of a serial killer or a suspected war criminal are violated, while ignoring massive violations of “ordinary” people’s rights. More precisely, the politically correct stance betrays its perverse economy through its oscillation between the two extremes: either fascination with the victimized other (helpless children, raped women . . .), or a focus on the problematic other who, although criminal, and so on, also deserves protection of his human rights, because “today it’s him, tomorrow it’ll be us” (an excellent example is Noam Chomsky’s defence of a French book advocating the revisionist stance on the Holocaust). On a different level, a similar instance of the perversity of Political Correctness occurs in Denmark, where people speak ironically of the “white woman’s burden”, her ethico-political duty to have sex with immigrant workers from Third World countries — this being the final necessary step in ending their exclusion. Today, in the era of what Habermas designated as die neue Unubersichtlichkeit (the new opacity),~ our everyday experience is more mystifying than ever: modernization generates new obscurantisms; the reduction of freedom is presented to us as the dawn of new freedoms. The perception that we live in a society of free choices, in which we have to choose even our most “natural” features (ethnic or sexual identity), is the form of appearance of its very opposite: of the absence of true choices. The recent trend for “alternate reality” films, which present existing reality as one of a multitude of possible outcomes, is symptomatic of a society in which choices no longer really matter, are trivialized. The lesson of the time-warp narratives is even bleaker, since it points towards a total closure: the very attempt to avoid the predestined course of things not only leads us back to it, but actually constitutes it — from Oedipus onwards, we want to avoid A, and it is through our very detour that A realizes itself. In these circumstances, we should be especially careful not to confuse the ruling ideology with ideology which seems to dominate. More than ever, we should bear in mind Walter Benjamin’s reminder that it is not enough to ask how a certain theory (or art) positions itself with regard to social struggles — we ask how it actually functions in these very struggles. In sex, the true hegemonic attitude is not patriarchal repression, but free promiscuity; in art, provocations in the style of the notorious “Sensation” exhibitions are the norm, the example of art fully integrated into the establishment. Ayn Rand brought this logic to its conclusion, supplementing it with a kind of Hegelian twist, that is, reasserting the official ideology itself as its own greatest transgression, as in the title of one of her late non-fiction books: “Capitalism, This Unknown Ideal”, or in “top managers, America’s last endangered species”. Indeed, since the “normal” functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of the basic principle of its functioning (today’s model capitalist is someone who, after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse, etc., posing as a humanitarian), the ultimate act of transgression is to assert this principle directly, depriving it of its humanitarian mask. I am therefore tempted to reverse Marx’s Thesis 11: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: “What can we do against global capital?”), but to question the hegemonic ideological co-ordinates. In short, our historical moment is still that of Adorno: To the question “What should we do?” I can most often truly answer only with “I don’t know.” I can only try to analyse rigorously what there is. Here people reproach me: When you practise criticism, you are also obliged to say how one should make it better. To my mind, this is incontrovertibly a bourgeois preiudice. Many times in history it so happened that the very works which pursued purely theoretical goals transformed consciousness, and thereby also social reality. If, today, we follow a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space — it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates: those who “really want to do something to help people” get involved in (undoubtedly honourable) exploits like Mediecins sans frontieres, Greenpeace, feminist and anti-racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly encroach on economic territory (for example, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions, or use child labour) — they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit.6 This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity: of doing things not in order to achieve something, but to prevent something from really happening, really changing. All this frenetic humanitarian, Politically Correct, etc., activity fits the formula of “Let’s go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!”. If standard Cultural Studies criticize capitalism, they do so in the coded way that exemplifies Hollywood liberal paranoia: the enemy is “the system”, the hidden “organization”, the anti-democratic “conspiracy”, not simply capitalism and state apparatuses. The problem with this critical stance is not only that it replaces concrete social analysis with a struggle against abstract paranoiac fantasies, but that — in a typical paranoiac gesture — it unnecessarily redoubles social reality, as if there were a secret Organization behind the “visible” capitalist and state organs. What we should accept is that there is no need for a secret “organization-within-an-organization”. the “conspiracy” is already in the “visible” organization as such, in the capitalist system, in the way the political space and state apparatuses work.8 Let us take one of the hottest topics in today’s “radical” American academia: postcolonial studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, postcolonial studies tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities’ “right to narrate” their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress “otherness,” so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance towards the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance towards the “Stranger in Ourselves”, in our inability to confront what we have repressed in and of ourselves — the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudopsychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas. . . . (Why pseudo-psychoanalytic? Because the true lesson of psychoanalysis is not that the external events which fascinate and/or disturb us are just projections of our inner repressed impulses. The unbearable fact of life is that there really are disturbing events out there: there are other human beings who experience intense sexual enjoyment while we are half-impotent; there are people submitted to terrifying torture.. . . Again, the ultimate truth of psychoanalysis is not that of discovering our true Self, but that of the traumatic encounter with an unbearable Real.) The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that universities are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included — up to a point), but conceptual: notions of “European” critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. At a certain point, this chic becomes indistinguishable from the famous Citibank commercial in which scenes of East Asian, European, Black and American children playing is accompanied by the voice-over: “People who were once divided by a continent ... are now united by an economy” — at this concluding highpoint, of course, the children are replaced by the Citibank logo. The great majority of today’s “radical” academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with a secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play the stock market). If there is one thing they are genuinely afraid of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life-environment of the “symbolic classes” in developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when they are dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, and so on, is thus ultimately a defence against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: “Let’s talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change, to make sure that nothing will really change!” The journal October is typical of this: when you ask one of the editors what the title refers to, they half-confidentially indicate that it is, of course, that October — in this way, you can indulge in jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the secret assurance that you are somehow retaining a link with the radical revolutionary past.. . . With regard to this radical chic, our first gesture towards Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be one of praise: at least they play their game straight, and are honest in their acceptance of the global capitalist co-ordinates — unlike pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt an attitude of utter disdain towards the Third Way, while their own radicalism ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obliges no one to do anything definite. There is, of course, a strict distinction to be made here between authentic social engagement on behalf of exploited minorities (for example, organizing illegally employed chicano field workers in California) and the multiculturalist/postcolonial “plantations of no-risk, no-fault, knock-off rebellion” which prosper in “radical” American academia. If, however, in contrast to corporate multiculturalism”, we define “critical multiculturalism” as a strategy of pointing out that “there are common forces of oppression, common strategies of exclusion, stereotyping, and stigmatizing of oppressed groups, and thus common enemies and targets of attack,” I do not see the appropriateness of the continuing use of the term “multiculturalism”, since the accent shifts here to the common struggle. In its normal accepted meaning, multiculturalism perfectly fits the logic of the global market.

#### The affirmative misreads politics. Any understanding of state oppression outside of capital prevents overcoming oppression.

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[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, p. 65]

The modern state as the comprehensive political command structure of capital — is both the necessary prerequisite for the transformation of capital’s at first fragmented units into a viable system, and the overall framework for the full articulation and maintenance of the latter as a global system. In this fundamental sense the state on account of its constitutive and permanently sustaining role must be understood as an integral part of capital’s material ground itself. Or it contributes in a substantive way not only to the formation and consolidation of all of the major reproductive structures of society but also to their continued functioning. However, the close interrelationship holds also when viewed from the other side. For the modern state itself is quite inconceivable without capital as its social metabolic foundation. This makes the material reproductive structures of the capital system the necessary condition not only for the original constitution but also for the continued survival (and appropriate historical transformations) of the modern state in all its dimensions. These reproductive structures extend their Impact over everything, from the strictly material/repressive instruments cid juridical institutions of the state all the way to the most mediated ideological and political theorizations of its raison d’être and claimed legitimacy.¶ It is on account of this reciprocal determination that we must speak of a close match between the social metabolic ground of the capital system on the one hand, and the modern state as the totalizing political command structure of the established productive and reproductive order on the other. For socialists this is a most uncomfortable and challenging reciprocity. It puts into relief the sobering fact that any intervention in the political domain — even when it envisages the radical overthrow of the capitalist state — can have only a very limited impact in the realization of the socialist project. And the other way round, the corollary of the same sobering fact is that, precisely because socialists have to confront the power of capital’s self-sustaining reciprocity under its fundamental dimensions, it should be never forgotten or ignored - although the tragedy of seventy years (if Soviet experience is that it had been willfully ignored — that there can be no chance of overcoming the power of capital without remaining faithful to the Marxian concern with the ‘withering away’ of the state.

### Second Off

**The United States federal government should eliminate ‘signature strikes’ and make its targeted killing program transparent.**

#### Secrecy is the bigger subversion of ethics in the drones debate. Transparency is required for productive debate about the moral complexities of war and develop norms that guide international use.

Brunstetter & Braun 2011

Daniel Brunstetter, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine and codirector of UC Irvine’s Program in Conflict Analysis and Resolution; Megan Braun, Rhodes Scholar pursuing a master’s in Philosophy in International Relations at Oxford University; “The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol 25, Iss 03

While the Uruzgan incident illustrates that the U.S. military is instituting an intensive after-action investigation to establish procedural recommendations that will bring drones into the fold of jus in bello norms, the sectors of the drone program controlled by the CIA, notably in Pakistan, lack the same public transparency and accountability. This secrecy is presumably rooted in national security concerns, and does not in itself mean the CIA does not follow any rules of engagement; but the fact that alleged jus in bello violations have occurred raises important ethical considerations. Without transparency, there is no way to know why a specific strike was undertaken, if it was undertaken with discrimination and proportionality in mind, or even whether it reflected military necessity.¶ Several consequences emerge from this public accountability void. First, there is no public system of checks and balances to guide the targeting decisions being made. According to Mary Dudziak, “Drones are a technological step that further isolates the American people from military action, undermining political checks” on the use of force.53 While there is certainly some protocol that guides the CIA drone program, the lack of public accountability raises ethical concerns similar to the privatization of military forces. As James Pattison argues, the use of private military companies allows “a government to deploy military force without the blatancy of state action—for instance by enabling foreign policy by proxy.” He goes on to say that these personnel “operate largely outside the effective jurisdiction of national and international law,” and concludes that “there is currently no effective system of accountability to govern the conduct of [private military company personnel], and this can lead to cases where the horrors of war—most notably civilian casualties—can go unchecked.”54¶ Arguably, such is the case with the CIA drone program. Critics of the program have pointed to the trend of an ever-widening target list over the last few years to suggest that more targets are being deemed legitimate and that military planners are starting to use drones in a broader context. Initially, only top terrorist leaders were targeted; today, lower officials and even drug lords who may not have a terrorist affiliation are also allegedly being targeted.55¶ The principles of the just war tradition demand accountability to adjudicate these jus in bello concerns. However, the CIA's use of drones points to an apparent tension that emerges between transparency and upholding national security by acting on just cause in secrecy. While Walzer argues that “there can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women,”56 Anderson asserts that drone technology “forces onto the table” a bigger discussion about the CIA's role in future conflicts, raising questions about the need for public accountability and whether justice can be achieved behind closed doors.57 To the extent that military leaders perceive that engaging in just cause requires secrecy, then we as citizens are at the sufferance of a specific leader's interpretation of just war principles. In addition, the current lack of transparency stymies a public forum for debate about the moral complexities that arise from drone usage. The lack of such a forum, as Anthony Lang argued with regards to international criminal justice, will likely lead to a lack of shared normative consensus on drone usage within the international community.58 This is potentially problematic given that, as noted above, the United States is not the only country using drones. The just war tradition, however, does provide a framework for debate that scholars can turn to to deliberate on the scope of drone usage today, and in the future.

### Third Off

#### We must conceptualize the just use of drones in an era of changing warfare, otherwise technology will outpace ethics and a new era of robotic warfare will be used without guidelines.

Brunstetter & Braun 11

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The arguments that we make here are not intended to suggest that drones should not be used to fight wars, but rather to highlight the need to update our moral thinking in ways that take into account the technological advantages (and disadvantages) of drones. Just as terrorism and the pervasiveness of conflicts with nonstate actors have transformed the context in which we evaluate the traditional principles of the just war tradition, so too should the increased trend of drone usage. To assume that they are just like any other weapon, and therefore do not challenge the way just war principles are understood, is to underestimate their current impact and postpone what must be an inevitable renegotiation of just war principles as drone technology (and eventually robotics) becomes more integrated into military strategy.¶ The ethical questions raised in this article are not the end of the story, but a point of departure for future research. If P. W. Singer is correct, then robotics will be the next revolution in military affairs, with advancements in drone technology leading the way. Projecting into the not-so-distant future, one can imagine a series of scenarios that may further alter our understanding and application of just war principles. Experts predict the eventual development of a fleet of drones forming expanding web-of-surveillance centers, capable of staying aloft for up to five years and providing rapid armed responses across the globe.59 This would arguably facilitate targeting terrorism and upholding the principles of the Responsibility to Protect, while further diminishing the importance of state sovereignty. But will all states agree to such a distribution of drones? Can any state, or set of states, employ such a network? Under what conditions? In addition, robotics experts are currently developing drones the size and shape of a hummingbird capable of surveillance and, eventually, lethal action. Other drones the size of bumblebees capable of swarming are being imagined. Presumably, such drones could dramatically reduce collateral damage. Would they render traditional methods of warfare, such as the use of bombs and missiles, so disproportionate as to be obsolete? What rules would govern their use? What would their just use entail?¶ The day in which drones and/or robots entirely replace humans on the battlefield may be a long way off (if it ever comes), but drones have already attained, and will likely continue to gain, a vital role in military affairs. Before technical developments outpace our capacity to navigate the ethical challenges introduced by human ingenuity, just war theorists need to recognize that drones change (and their continued evolution will continue to change) the nature of warfare. The just war tradition spans several thousand years. Over time, our idea of what constitutes a just or unjust war has undergone a process of negotiation and renegotiation. The next challenge for just war theorists is to bring this unique and profound body of knowledge to bear on the relationship between drones and military ethics.

#### The mind/body dualism ignores emotion as embodiment and is the Western thought they criticize. Even well-intentioned dualism exacerbates a view of women as hysterical and in need of male correction.

Williams 01 Simon, professor of sociology at the University of Warwick, Emotion and Social Theory: Corporeal Reflections on the (Ir) Rational, SAGE

Debates continue to rage, as these very questions suggest, as to what precisely emotions are and how they should be studied. The sociology of emotions in this respect, given a variety of competing perspectives and multiple research agendas, is perhaps a 'victim of its own success‘ (Wouters 1992: 248). All the contributors to Kemper’s (1990a) volume, for example, can be seen as actively engaging with, or contesting traditional sociological divisions such as the biological versus the social, micro ver sus macro, quantitative versus qualitative, positivism versus naturalism, prediction versus description, and managing versus accounting for emotions. A useful starting point here, given these debates, is to see emotions as complex, multifaceted human compounds which arise, sociologically speaking, in a variety of sociorelational contexts, including fundamental processes of management, differentiation and change linking larger social structures with the emotional experiences and expressions of embodied individuals (Gordon 1990). This in turn suggests the need, as noted above, to work 'both ways' so to speak, from the social shaping of emotions by social structure to the emotional shaping of social structure itself (ibid.).¶ It is really, however, only within the past decade or so that a distinct corpus of work, mainly American in origin, has begun to emerge. Kemper, for example, traces the beginnings of American sociological interest in emotions back to the ’watershed’ year of 1975, arguing that, by the brink of the 1980s, the sociology of emotions was truly 'poised for developmental take-off' (1990b: 4). Landmark texts here include Hochschild's (1983) The Managed Heart and The Second (1990), Denzin's (1984) On Understanding Emolion, together with a variety of edited collections, including Franks and McCarthy’s (1989) The Sociology of Emotions, Kemper’s (1990a) Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions, and three recent British volumes: Fineman's (1993) Emotion in Orgmlizalions, James and Gabe’s (19%) Health and the Sociology of Emotions, and Bendelow and \Mlliams' (1998a) Emotions in Social Life. To this we may add other recent contributions from Australian scholars such as Lupton's (1998a) The Emotional Self, and Barbalet’s (1998) Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structum, alongside calls, by Game and Metcalfe (1996), for a more Passionate Sociology in general.‘ A Passionate Sociology, these authors suggest:¶ celebrates immersion in life, a compassionate involvement with the world and with others a sensual full-bodied approach to knowing and to practices of knowledge such as reading, writing, teaching Passion, social life and sociology only exist in the in-between, in specific moving social relations. (1996: 5)¶ Despite this promising start, much still remains to be done in order to redress this traditional neglect. The roots of this neglect, as we shall see, lie deeply buried in the history of Western thought, which has sought to divorce mind from body, nature from culture, reason from emotion, and public from private. Emotions as such have tended to be dismissed as private, ‘irrational' inner feelings or sensations, tied, historically, to women’s ’hysterical' bodies and 'dangerous desires'. Here the dominant view, dating as tar back as Plato and receiving a further Descartean twist in the seventeenth century, seems to have been that emotions need to be 'tamed’, 'harnessed‘ or 'driven out' by the steady hand of (male) reason.2 These views in turn have been forged into sociological orthodoxy at both the theoretical and methodological levels.¶ To the extent that classical social theorists in general and sociological scholars in particular turned their attention to these issues, the tendency has been to define human actors in largely ‘disembodied' terms as rational agents who make choices based on ’utility’ criteria or ‘general value' orientations (Turner 1991). This view, with its heavily 'cognitive bias’, finds its fullest expression perhaps in contemporary versions of rational choice theory (Coleman and Fararo 1992).3 Conscious ratiocination rather than the emotional foundations of action, was seen as most important, with little room left for the 'lived', ’mindful' or ’emotionally expressive’ body as the intercorporeal, intersubjective basis of social order, conflict or exchange. The emotional body through the sociological stress upon rational economic action, became ‘external‘ to the actor who appeared as a rational, disembodied, decision-making agent (Turner 1991).¶ Bodies and emotions then, at least Ziccvording to standard accounts of their history, have tended to enjoy a rather ethereal, implicit existence within sociology. Reasons for this apparent neglect are manifold, including the suspicion of biological reductionism and its associated essentialist baggage, a conceptualization of human agency linked to the capacities of the rational mind, and the fact that the so-called ‘founding fathers' of sociology were all men the grand-masters of their craft. Locating themselves squarely among the geisteswissenschaften, sociologists have tended to perpetuate rather than challenge the dualist legacies of the past, in which mind and body, nature and culture, reason and emotion, public and private have been artificially separated and rigidly reinforced.

#### Drones should be positively re-envisioned as a disruption status quo gendered military dyads. The affirmative only sees the other perspective which cedes interpretation of “men’s and women’s jobs” in the military.

Manjikian 13

Mary, Assistant Professor in the Robertson School of Government at Regent University, “Becoming Unmanned: The Gendering of Lethal Autonomous Warfare Technology,” International Feminist Journal of Politics

If technological change causes us to query the changing activities of the warfighter, it also leads us to examine changing gender roles in warfighting. In 1991, Donna Haraway predicted that the development of human/machine hybrids known as cyborgs would lead to conceptual disruption (Roberts 2008: 80) including the breaking of the male–female and protector–protected dyad. She noted that feminist technoscience ‘means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships’ (Weber 2006: 181). She described the cyborg as post-human, as it would result from a merging of human and technology. A cyborg could thus be, for example, an individual who had prosthetics or biological implants which enhanced his natural capabilities as his neural pathways merged with robotics. In the words of Haraway, the cyborg world is:¶ … about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanent partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. (Haraway 1990: 220)¶ Following her logic, the UAV might be conceptualized of as a merging of man and machine, or as a type of cyborg. Recent writing in the military and technology communities indeed indicates a high level of debate regarding questions of operator guilt and culpability when a drone strike is made. Analysts differ on how involved (or enmeshed) the human operator should feel with the weapon which carries out the killing, and whether it is in fact psychologically healthier for the operator to feel heavily engaged or completely disengaged. Some analysts suggest that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in drone operators can be lessened by increasing the operator's engagement with the machine, while others argue the reverse (Axe 2012).¶ In addition, we could build a cyborg narrative to describe new technological developments which seek to insert implants (or mini-robots) into soldiers themselves. These implants – which are already in production and in use in selected units – can act autonomously to monitor the soldier's health, to repair damage sustained by the warfighter, to enhance his or her natural capabilities in fields like eyesight or hearing and to create and share communications between the individual warfighter and the group. Such technology could replace or overcome biology and could, in the words of Roberts (2008), ‘bridge the ever-widening gaps between “nature” and “us”’. This scenario is becoming a reality with the US military's recent commitment to working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to create the Revolutionizing Prosthetics Program. This program, aimed at providing better prosthetics to wounded soldiers, is gradually eliminating the boundaries between those with disabilities and those without disabilities. A recent article on the US Army's own website notes that:¶ Robotics has long fascinated the mind of the public. Androids, bionic men and exoskeletons populate both the large and small screens. But until recently, the technology seen in pop culture has not been manifested in daily life. Now, the Department of Defense is revolutionizing the field of prosthetics and turning science fiction into science fact. (Hames 2010)¶ In addition, we can point to new Department of Defense guidance to weapons developers which encourages them to create new types of non-humanoid robots, many of which involve borrowing or building upon the characteristics of animals and creatures which exist in nature (Lim 2012) – again blurring the line between nature, man and technology. Lt Gen. Ross Thompson, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology, recently noted that biotechnology is important:¶ in terms of really mimicking biology to come up with new ideas for protection, sensing, communications, for doing things in ways that billions of years of evolution have helped living things to do things, and exploiting that knowledge to design man-made systems. (Hames 2008, emphasis added)¶ New devices in development include the Sand Flea, a robot which can ‘jump’ in order to better detect IEDs (Nelson 2012), a new robot that ‘bends and crawls like a worm’, one that can camouflage itself (Lim 2012) and robotic ‘mules’ to carry soldiers’ gear (Berton 2011).¶ Finally, we could frame a cyborg narrative to theorize about long-term gender effects as a result of the introduction of the Human Universal Load Carriage (or HULC), a type of prosthetic armor in development for use by able-bodied soldiers (Chavez 2011). Thompson describes the exoskeleton as ‘a robotic device the soldier wears like a full body suit. It would enhance Soldier performance, increasing strength without losing agility’ (Hames 2008). Both implants and the exoskeleton thus create a situation where technology is not merely something used by the warrior, but rather part of who he or she is. The cyborg narrative suggests that an exoskeleton could level the playing field through increasing the ability of women warriors to lift heavy loads through augmenting their upper body strength. In an article on the official Army.mil website, a developer notes that ‘this is absolutely focused on the American Warfighter and all of the jobs he or she will have to do’ (emphasis added)7. A woman interviewed in the same article notes as well that ‘this will magnify human strength while on the battlefield’ (Chavez 2011). Harnessing of robotic technology thus holds the promise that women soldiers may more successfully enter combat, since physical requirements are replaced by requirements for mental acuity and reflexes. Indeed, increased use of new technologies of this type might affect the gender makeup of the military in the long term as many different types of people might be drawn to the military as a career, including more women.¶ In addition, many new autonomous technologies are focused on the areas of tracking and communications, again invoking the language of the cyborg, as planners explain how in the future the military unit will be linked together through two-way blue force tracking capabilities which provide GPS coordinates for individual soldiers to be shared among a unit, thus providing info on where the friendly unit is located and who the friendly unit is, as well as info on status and intent (Sweeney 2008). Using these technologies, each member can be aware of the physical position, physical health and intent of all members of the unit. In this way, the unit could in the future behave more like a hive or a swarm (or the Borg of the Star Trek canon). Leadership would thus rest not on a traditional, hierarchical unit but rather on a network in which members interact not only with the leadership but also laterally with each other. Such a development could go far towards destabilizing traditional hierarchical leadership forms in the military, which are often coded as male instead of creating a more cooperative mode of war fighting. Once again, these technologies might thus represent a step towards the destabilization of the traditional gendered regime of women's jobs and men's jobs.

#### Their over-focus on technological change obscures the social constructions placed onto machines. Without a positive, emancipatory projection of drones, military leaders will exacerbate gendered conceptions of technology.

Manjikian 13

Mary, Assistant Professor in the Robertson School of Government at Regent University, “Becoming Unmanned: The Gendering of Lethal Autonomous Warfare Technology,” International Feminist Journal of Politics

Thus, developments in the field of autonomous warfare provide fodder for the constructivist position that technological developments do not necessarily lead to social progress or change. In the SCOT school, analysts argue that technology's meaning is largely dictated by the environment and by the usage regimes imposed by those who control the technology. According to this view, technological inventions alone can never force a change in social structures, though, in certain instances, technological developments might help to support social changes being carried out by the users (Pinch and Bijker 1984; LaTour 2005; Oldenziel and Zachmann 2009). As Grint and Woolgar suggest:¶ The gender of a technology does not lie encased in the fabric of the material. It is instead a temporary contingent upshot of ongoing interpretation by designers, sellers and users. The politics and values of technology result from the gaze of the human; they do not lie in the gauze of the machine. (Grint and Woolgar 1995: 305)¶ Thus, so far it appears that the military has been able to ‘hold the line’, introducing new technologies while simultaneously dictating to their designers and their end-users what they will mean and how they will be used. In this instance, it, thus, appears possible to introduce revolutionary technologies without necessarily leading to a significant change in the activity of a warfighter, the role of a warfighter or the overall meaning of warfare. The emancipatory potential of autonomous technology, thus, might exist but has not so far been realized.

###  Case

#### Drones do not represent disembodied views – they are not indiscriminately bombing. The screen becomes a moral mirror that can force the pilot to think of the other as themselves

Coeckelbergh 13

Mark, Philosophy Professor at the University of Twente in the Netherlands and managing director of the 3TU Centre for Ethics and Technology, Ph.D. from University of Birmingham; “Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting,” Ethics and Information Technology, Vol 15, Iss 2, June

First, even if drone fighting had the effect of creating¶ (more) moral distance, it does not exclude ethical reflection¶ based on values and concerns that live in the society of¶ which the military is always part. By focusing only on the¶ face-to-face relation between me and the other, that is, the¶ I-you relation (if I may borrow Buber’s terms here), Levinasian¶ ethics neglects the wider social context of the¶ practice and excludes moral concerns that arise outside that¶ relation, such as those that are produced in ethical deliberation¶ about war and about a just society. Next to this¶ analysis, we need to learn from broader theories about¶ society and politics in order to better understand how a¶ particular fighting practice can emerge and be sustained,¶ and what kind of ‘macro’ ethical issues come up. And¶ while we must remain critical of what moral principles and¶ moral reasoning can do in real-life situations such as those¶ on a battlefield, a morality that is only based on the personal¶ face-to-face encounter is too narrow.¶ Explicit moral reflection can play a role at several levels.¶ To begin with the fighters themselves: drone pilots and¶ those who command them are not morally passive fighting¶ machines, but can and do reflect on what they do as moral¶ subjects. The same is true for politicians and the citizens¶ they claim to represent, and for the designers of the technology.¶ An analysis of the epistemic and moral impact of¶ drone fighting may actually inform discussions about drone¶ fighting within the military and contribute to pubic discussions¶ and political deliberations about the ethical¶ quality and justification of this kind of fighting.¶ Second, although it may be true that remote fighting¶ implies a less embodied, social and engaged way of beingin-¶ the-world (to use Heidegger’s term), drone pilots are¶ still embodied, social, meaning-giving beings, and also¶ experience their fighting and killing in an embodied way.¶ Let me explain this. The fighter who watches a screen is¶ indeed removed from the ‘real’ battlefield and from the¶ ‘real’ cockpit and ‘real’ airspace, but this does not imply¶ that his way of knowing what goes on ‘over there’ amounts¶ to a totally disembodied mode of knowing. The drone pilot¶ may not only draw on his previous ‘real’ experience of¶ flying an airplane and of bombing; his ‘electronic’ way of¶ fighting is also one that requires ‘bodily’ involvement and¶ involves ‘bodily’ experience. As he handles the stick and¶ watches the screen, he does not completely ‘‘leave his body¶ behind’’, as a Dreyfusian might argue. This is so for at least¶ two reasons. One is a principled one and has to do with our¶ kind of existence. As a human being, the operator can only¶ know through his body and through his engagement with¶ the technologies and—via the technologies—with the battlefield¶ and the people on that battlefield. Mediation by¶ ICTs does not amount to totally disembodied perception¶ and knowledge. Even if our experience and knowledge is¶ mediated in such a way that we experience more distance¶ and are often less aware of our body, we always remain¶ human beings and cannot fully escape an embodied mode¶ of knowing. The more practical, empirical reason—which¶ is related to the principled one since it presupposes¶ embodied existence—is that interviews with drone operators¶ suggest that pilots do have an embodied killing¶ experience. Colonel D. Scott Brenton, who remotely flies a¶ Reaper drone, is reported to acknowledge ‘the peculiar new¶ disconnect of fighting a telewar with a joystick and a¶ throttle from his padded seat in American suburbia’ but the¶ journalist also reports that when he fires a missile in order¶ to kill someone ‘the hair on the back of his neck stands up’¶ and that when he leaves ‘a dark room of video screens’,¶ ‘his adrenaline [is] still surging after squeezing the trigger’¶ (Bumiller 2012). This is because drone warfare is not a¶ ‘sanitized video game’ (Bumiller 2012). I will further¶ explain below why.¶ Furthermore, as social beings the members of the drone¶ crew are (still) part of a social environment and network at¶ the airbase and elsewhere (e.g. family and friends). They¶ may not literally see people and talk to people while flying¶ the plane, but their cognitive and moral way of dealing¶ with the world and with others is deeply shaped by the¶ forms of sociality of which they are part and ‘in’ which¶ they live. When they enter the airbase, they do not completely¶ leave behind ‘home’. And the military and the¶ practice of drone fighting have their own forms of sociality.¶ Thus, although one cannot deny the physical, social, and¶ moral distancing effects of the technological practice, as¶ embodied and social beings, drone pilots are likely to¶ experience some empathetic bridging when they view their¶ targets and therefore do not that easily overcome their¶ inhibitions on killing. Their screens then work as moral¶ mirrors: they see others who, like them, have family and¶ friends, have bodies, are vulnerable too.¶ Moreover, this is likely to happen when and since the¶ technology changes in such a way that the screenfighters¶ get ‘closer’ to those they are supposed to monitor and¶ perhaps kill. They can now zoom in on particular people¶ and see what they are doing. This epistemic situation is still¶ different from actually being on or near to that battlefield¶ or being in that city, for sure, but it is a qualitatively different¶ epistemic situation from World War II bombing:¶ drone pilots do not only see a ‘city’ and ‘smoke’;¶ increasingly they also see people, what they do, and what¶ happens to them when they are bombed, wounded, killed.¶ To quote Colonel Brenton:¶ I see mothers with children, I see fathers with children,¶ I see fathers with mothers, I see kids playing¶ soccer (Brenton quoted in Bumiller 2012)¶ This does not make it easier to kill, since one sees the¶ people, their lives, and the effect of the bombing on them¶ and their families. This is due to technology: ‘the drones¶ have powerful cameras that bring war straight into the¶ pilot’s face’ (Bumiller 2012). In contrast to the Hiroshima¶ bomber, the pilot now knows what he is doing. It turns out¶ that the new ‘distancing’ technologies, which always also¶ were ‘bridging’ technologies, are now creating a kind of¶ epistemic bridge that somewhat mitigates the distancing¶ effects that were morally problematic. The epistemic¶ bridge then becomes a moral bridge, one that lets empathy¶ cross to the other side, so to speak (albeit in one direction¶ only). Of course there is still a significant qualitative¶ epistemic and moral difference between a face-screen-face¶ relation and a ‘real’ face-to-face relation. But at least the¶ new technologies create the possibility for the screenfighters¶ to bridge the moral distance between them and their¶ ‘targets’ by imagining the lives of those they are supposed¶ to kill.

#### The surveillance component of drones is key to ‘ethical hacking’ that subverts drones into anti-killing machines

Coeckelbergh 13

Mark, Philosophy Professor at the University of Twente in the Netherlands and managing director of the 3TU Centre for Ethics and Technology, Ph.D. from University of Birmingham; “Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting,” Ethics and Information Technology, Vol 15, Iss 2, June

We can conclude that the new technologies create and¶ maintain distance, but at the same time also make possible¶ an empathic response. The moral mirroring that goes on in¶ these situations or afterwards brings back moral responsibility¶ (it contributes to meeting the second, epistemic¶ Aristotelian condition) and makes it less likely that killing¶ becomes as ‘easy’ as the moral distance thesis suggests,¶ although it does not prevent killing.¶ Finally, if and in so far as this kind of bridging is not¶ seen as an undesirable ‘by-product’ of the practice, indeed¶ as a ‘problem’ that needs to be solved (say a kind of moral¶ ‘‘collateral damage’’), but rather as a process that can help¶ to avoid killing, it may amount to (making possible) a kind¶ of ‘ethical hacking’4 of the (otherwise) distancing technologies¶ and of the drone fighting practice: the surveillance¶ technology that is meant for fighting and for killing then¶ becomes an anti-killing technology; it thus subverts the¶ very purpose of the technology. Bringing back the faces¶ can then be regarded as one way of trying to contribute to¶ peace—or at least one way of trying to find a way of¶ fighting that involves less killing and suffering.

#### Government weapons use is inevitable – there is no better alternative to drones use – criticizing drones doesn’t resolve larger questions of warmaking.

Anderson 13 - senior fellow in Governance Studies at Brookings and a professor of law at American University (May 24, Kenneth, “The Case for Drones” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the_case_for_drones_118548.html>)

Yet irrespective of what numbers one accepts as the best estimate of harms of drone warfare, or the legal proportionality of the drone strikes, the moral question is simply, What’s the alternative? One way to answer this is to start from the proposition that if you believe the use of force in these circumstances is lawful and ethical, then all things being equal as an ethical matter, the method of force used should be the one that spares the most civilians while achieving its lawful aims. If that is the comparison of moral alternatives, there is simply no serious way to dispute that drone warfare is the best method available. It is more discriminating and more precise than other available means of air warfare, including manned aircraft—as France and Britain, lacking their own drones and forced to rely on far less precise manned jet strikes, found over Libya and Mali—and Tomahawk cruise missiles. A second observation is to look across the history of precision weapons in the past several decades. I started my career as a human-rights campaigner, kicking off the campaign to ban landmines for leading organizations. Around 1990, I had many conversations with military planners, asking them to develop more accurate and discriminating weapons—ones with smaller kinetic force and greater ability to put the force where sought. Although every civilian death is a tragedy, and drone warfare is very far from being the perfect tool the Obama administration sometimes suggests, for someone who has watched weapons development over a quarter century, the drone represents a steady advance in precision that has cut zeroes off collateral-damage figures. Those who see only the snapshot of civilian harm today are angered by civilian deaths. But barring an outbreak of world peace, it is foolish and immoral not to encourage the development and use of more sparing and exact weapons. One has only to look at the campaigns of the Pakistani army to see the alternatives in action. The Pakistani military for many years has been in a running war with its own Taliban and has regularly attacked villages in the tribal areas with heavy and imprecise airstrikes. A few years ago, it thought it had reached an accommodation with an advancing Taliban, but when the enemy decided it wanted not just the Swat Valley but Islamabad, the Pakistani government decided it had no choice but to drive it back. And it did, with a punishing campaign of airstrikes and rolling artillery barrages that leveled whole villages, left hundreds of thousands without homes, and killed hundreds. But critics do not typically evaluate drones against the standards of the artillery barrage of manned airstrikes, because their assumption, explicit or implicit, is that there is no call to use force at all. And of course, if the assumption is that you don’t need or should not use force, then any civilian death by drones is excessive. That cannot be blamed on drone warfare, its ethics or effectiveness, but on a much bigger question of whether one ought to use force in counterterrorism at all.

#### Limiting the use of drones leads to boots on the ground

Jacobstein 2013 - co-chair of AI and Robotics at Singularity University, located inside NASA Research Park (September, Neil, “Drones: A 360 Degree View” World Policy Journal 2013 30: 14, <http://wpj.sagepub.com/content/30/3/14.full?etoc>)

Second, as President Barack Obama noted in his May 23, 2013 speech on the use of drones, the terrorist threat is real in sectors of the Middle East, especially Yemen, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier region. The United States and its allies cannot simply ignore the threat. In some select cases, we will need to send in “boots on the ground” or drones. Each alternative has strengths and weaknesses, and the tradeoffs are difficult. Sending in troops may seem more humane, until the troops are your close relatives. The process for deciding on the actions to be taken needs to be clear, transparent (at least to government representatives outside the defense and intelligence community), and ethical. It should have a high probability of being able to stand up to critical review a decade or two later.

#### Troops cause worse collateral damage

Zenko 2013 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Compared to other military tools, the advantages of using drones— particularly, that they avoid direct risks to U.S. servicemembers— vastly outweigh the limited costs and consequences. Decision-makers are now much more likely to use lethal force against a range of perceived threats than in the past. Since 9/11, over 95 percent of all nonbattlefield targeted killings have been conducted by drones—the remaining attacks were JSOC raids and AC-130 gunships and offshore sea- or air-launched cruise missiles. And the frequency of drone strikes is only increasing over time. George W. Bush authorized more nonbattlefield targeted killing strikes than any of his predecessors (50), and Barack Obama has more than septupled that number since he entered office (350). Yet without any meaningful checks—imposed by domestic or international political pressure—or sustained oversight from other branches of government, U.S. drone strikes create a moral hazard because of the negligible risks from such strikes and the unprecedented disconnect between American officials and personnel and the actual effects on the ground.14 However, targeted killings by other platforms would almost certainly inflict greater collateral damage, and the effectiveness of drones makes targeted killings the more likely policy option compared to capturing suspected militants or other nonmilitary options.

#### **Drones have the least civilian casualties – other numbers are inflated.**

Byman 13 Professor in Security Studies @ Georgetown

(Daniel Byman, , Senior Fellow in Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs Vol. 92 Iss. 4, “Why Drones Work”, EBSCO, acc. 6/26/13)

Despite the obvious benefits of using drones and the problems associated with the alternatives, numerous critics argue that drones still have too many disadvantages. First among them is an unacceptably high level of civilian casualties. Admittedly, drones have killed innocents. But the real debate is over how many and whether alternative approaches are any better. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that in 2011 alone, nearly 900 noncombatants, including almost 200 children, were killed by U.S. drone strikes. Columbia Law School's Human Rights Clinic also cites high numbers of civilian deaths, as does the Pakistani organization Pakistan Body Count. Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation oversees a database of drone casualties culled from U.S. sources and international media reports. He estimates that between 150 and 500 civilians have been killed by drones during Obama's administration. U.S. officials, meanwhile, maintain that drone strikes have killed almost no civilians. In June 2011, John Brennan, then Obama's top counterterrorism adviser, even contended that U.S. drone strikes had killed no civilians in the previous year. But these claims are based on the fact that the U.S. government assumes that all military-age males in the blast area of a drone strike are combatants -- unless it can determine after the fact that they were innocent (and such intelligence gathering is not a priority).¶ The United States has recently taken to launching "signature strikes," which target not specific individuals but instead groups engaged in suspicious activities. This approach makes it even more difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians and verify body counts of each. Still, as one U.S. official told The New York Times last year, "Al Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization -- innocent neighbors don't hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with guns and bombs." Of course, not everyone accepts this reasoning. Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani, who runs Pakistan Body Count, says that "neither [the United States] nor Pakistan releases any detailed information about the victims … so [although the United States] likes to call everybody Taliban, I call everybody civilians."¶ The truth is that all the public numbers are unreliable. Who constitutes a civilian is often unclear; when trying to kill the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, the United States also killed his doctor. The doctor was not targeting U.S. or allied forces, but he was aiding a known terrorist leader. In addition, most strikes are carried out in such remote locations that it is nearly impossible for independent sources to verify who was killed. In Pakistan, for example, the overwhelming majority of drone killings occur in tribal areas that lie outside the government's control and are prohibitively dangerous for Westerners and independent local journalists to enter.¶ Thus, although the New America Foundation has come under fire for relying heavily on unverifiable information provided by anonymous U.S. officials, reports from local Pakistani organizations, and the Western organizations that rely on them, are no better: their numbers are frequently doctored by the Pakistani government or by militant groups. After a strike in Pakistan, militants often cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves. The U.S. media often then draw on such faulty reporting to give the illusion of having used multiple sources. As a result, statistics on civilians killed by drones are often inflated. One of the few truly independent on-the-ground reporting efforts, conducted by the Associated Press last year, concluded that the strikes "are killing far fewer civilians than many in [Pakistan] are led to believe."¶ But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths -- about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism -- is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone's real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone's far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force.

#### Drone killing is more personal than conventional attacks – can see the results

Leo 2013 (July 11, Sarah, “Former drone operator: “I lost that respect for life”” <http://aoav.org.uk/2013/interview-former-drone-operator/>)

In a rare first-person account, former Air Force drone operator Brandon Bryant describes in painful detail how he watched the bloody results of his actions. How his targets lost limbs. How they bled out. And how the thermal images showed their bodies turn as cold as the ground they died on. “People say that drone strikes are like mortar attacks,” Bryant said. “Well, artillery doesn’t see this. Artillery doesn’t see the results of their actions. It’s really more intimate for us, because we see everything.” During his time guiding unmanned drones over Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 to 2007, more than 1,600 people died at the hands of Bryant and his team. He remembers being told this fact in a memo that he was given. Upon leaving his post, Bryant descended into the abyss – swallowed up with self-hatred. He now suffers from PTSD. This has “manifested itself as anger, sleeplessness and blackout drinking”. But what we know is that Bryant’s story cannot be unique. There must be others out there suffering the same demons. In Pakistan alone, at least 371 drones strikes have been reported since 2004. They have caused the deaths of at least 2,564 people, a large share of whom are civilians. These numbers, collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, reveal the shocking extent of the American drone war. In addition to strikes on Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, the Bureau also recorded further US led covert attacks in Somalia and Yemen. These were attacks that, by definition, were unmanned. But attacks that all had an operator working on a glowing screen in an American city thousands of miles away. Brandon Bryant’s admission should serve as a wake-up call. They should ram home the point that, even though executed via an system that might seem more video game than weapon, the act of killing is not even remotely virtual.

#### Their affirmative is an oversimplification – virtual war is real to drone operators

Holmqvist 2013 - Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics (May 1, Caroline, “Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare” Millennium - Journal of International Studies)

No doubt, drone warfare is infinitely more real for the populations amongst whom attacks take place, who risk being killed, losing loved ones or having their homes destroyed. Yet, while such arguments have understandable appeal, close study of drone operators’ activity yields a more complicated picture. Derek Gregory’s study of drone operators’ experience focuses on the ‘scopic regime’ that enables drone warfare in the first place and closely examines the different types of vision and imaging that drone operators are exposed to, from wide area airborne surveillance to the macro-field of micro-vision.24 These visibilities are conditional and conditioning because they are not merely technical feats but ‘techno-cultural accomplishments’.25 Rather than any straightforward abstracting of war into a video game, the abstracting that takes place is convoluted and paradoxical. Contrary to common perception, drone warfare is ‘real’ also for those staring at a screen and, as such, the reference to video games is often simplistic. It is the immersive quality of video games, their power to draw players into their virtual worlds, that make them potent – this is precisely why they are used in pre-deployment training.26 The video streams from the UAV are shown to have the same immersive quality on the drone operator – they produce the same ‘reality-effect’. Virtual war, it seems, is less virtual than would appear at first glance. This conclusion is strengthened by the growing realisation that drone operators suffer as high, and possibly higher, rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as soldiers engaged in battle as a result of exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye.27 In other words, drone operators see more than soldiers in theatre. This is not to imply any trivialising parallels between operating drones from afar and physical engagement in battle, however. The view of the ‘hunter-killer’ is, in Gregory’s words, still privileged as the drone operator empathises with his fellow comrades on the ground in Afghanistan and feels compelled to ‘protect’ and ‘help’ them by instructing to shoot.28 Ultimately, the ‘drone stare’ still furthers the subjugation of those marked as Other.29 What is of interest to us in examining the interaction of the virtual, material and human here, however, is that this occurs not through the experience (on the part of the drone operator) of distance, remoteness or detachment, but rather through the ‘sense of proximity’ to ground troops inculcated by the video feeds from the aerial platforms.30 The relationship between the fleshy body of the drone operator and the steely body of the drone and its ever-more sophisticated optical systems needs to be conceptualised in a way that allows for such paradoxes to be made intelligible.

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#### New technological capabilities themselves do not determine the outcome of military practice. The impacts to the 1AC are not the product of drones, but of military ideology. We should instead, positively re-imagine the drone as a possible disruption of gendered assumptions about war

Manjikian 13

Mary, Assistant Professor in the Robertson School of Government at Regent University, “Becoming Unmanned: The Gendering of Lethal Autonomous Warfare Technology,” International Feminist Journal of Politics

However, aside from these anecdotes, there has been no serious attempt by either military analysts or academics to analyze the gender implications of the shift towards war fighting through the use of UAVs and other types of autonomous technologies. Writing in 2004, Enloe asked academics to look for what she termed ‘silences’ in international relations (Enloe 2004). She asked that analysts consider questions which were thus far unidentified and unasked in international relations often because these issues were seen as not interesting to those concerned only with realist conceptions of politics. It was in these silences, she noted, that you would often find politics. In keeping with her advice, we can compare the language military analysts and the media use to describe drone actions with language used to describe conventional warfare. In 2006, while discussing the use of conventional forces in Iraq, then-President Bush described the need to protect the ‘innocent women and children’ of Iraq – both relying upon and helping to construct the traditional dyad between protector and protected with Iraq as a passive feminized state protected by America's masculine army or the masculine state, and with warfare as an explicitly gendered act in which soldiers (usually men) acted actively to protect the passive and weak female subjects (Shepherd 2006). In contrast, consider these three statements which refer to the actions of UAVs in the US and abroad. A recent letter from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the legality of using drones for environmental surveillance notes that ‘the EPA would use such flights in appropriate instances to protect people’ (Nemo 2012). Jennings, an academic, describes how UAVs can survey buildings damaged after a natural disaster and notes that ‘we could also have robots on the ground that would go into areas too dangerous for humans’ (Shaw 2012). Finally, Sauer and Schornig (2010) describe the distancing from the battlefield which a soldier experiences due to drone use. They note that the ‘drone stare’ can ‘literally dehumanize the conduct of combat’.¶ For feminists, the language shift presents an interesting puzzle and a subject for further exploration. We have previously considered changing gender roles in war by asking what might happen if women were added to the battlefield (DeGroot 2007), but we have not thus far asked what might happen if men and women were removed. At first glance, it seems obvious that such developments promise emancipation from constricting traditional gender roles for both sexes. In removing soldiers (of both genders) from the battlefield and outsourcing the ‘dirty work’ of war to machines, autonomous weapons could free men and women from the tyranny of warfighting and instead allow them to devote their attentions to other goals – just as Firestone (1970) suggested that technology had freed women from ‘the tyranny of reproduction’ and allowed them to devote their energies to other tasks (Cowan 1976).¶ Next, increased reliance on automated technologies could change relations between the sexes in war. The old dyad of protector/protected could be transformed when both men and women are protected by robots. If we accept Butler's (1990) argument that gender is performative, then the warfighter3 (whether male or female) might be coded as female, since he or she is now a passive agent requiring protection which is actively provided by a machine (Shepherd 2006: 25). In addition, Sauer and Schornig suggest that drones are a ‘silver bullet’ for democracies, since their use may allow powerful nations to claim that they are not belligerent or hostile. But if so, the silver bullet might enable industrialized nations to be seen as softer, more passive and thus perhaps female.¶ Thirdly, increased reliance on automated technologies could change the gender construct of war itself as distance from the battlefield creates a disembodiment of war. In recent writings on the experience of war, Sylvester (2012) urges analysts to consider ‘the body of war’, arguing that for many years analysts have focused insufficiently upon the human actors who carry out the killing activities of war as well as those who are killed and the way in which the experience of both, killing (which the military refers to as ‘kinetic activity’) and being killed or wounded, is central to the culture of war. But what is the experience of war if distances from the battlefield become greater and a remote pilot can literally decimate a community without having any blood on his hands? If killing is carried out wholly autonomously by a robot who makes decisions using artificial intelligence without any input from a human operator (an eventuality which is entirely possible in the near future), can the robot be said to have ‘experienced war’? Removing the body of the warfighter from the battlefield could thus decisively change the construct of warfare and therefore the state itself.¶ Historically, nation building has rested in part on the individual soldier who functions as a symbol of a ‘national masculinity’ (Nye 2007). If warfare is instead ‘outsourced’ to machines who do not (and indeed cannot) attach the same values to these activities, warfare itself may become a less significant theme in our narratives of national identity. For example, Singer (2009: 252) suggests that suicide bombing will become a pointless exercise if warfare becomes an arena for achieving technological goals rather than an enactment of injuring and the taking of risks. Changing the gender construct of war thus offers the promise that war itself, along with nationalism, could potentially become irrelevant. And in a world where combat is the province of machines rather than humans, masculine claims to superiority in the political system by virtue of their enacting the defense function become void.¶ Finally, if militarism is defined as ‘the commitment of social resources to the waging of war’ (Kaplan 1994: 123), then new social formations, in which warfighting is automated and fewer human social resources are devoted to militarism, will have far-reaching effects on our societies. A society which is less militarized may be one which is more just and equitable for all members, including women. And as states become less militarized, significant transformation of the international system will result as well.¶ Thus, autonomous technology has the potential to change what warfighters do, how they interact with one another, and how both soldiers and the broader society engage in – and understand – warfare. However, just as debate rages over whether reproductive technologies have helped women empower their own reproduction or whether they have merely succeeded in making women into new technological subjects of a male reproductive scientific regime (Wajcman 1991), one can identify two contrasting positions about military robotics and their effects on gender politics: either they accentuate and strengthen traditional conceptions of gender by creating a hypermasculine ‘super soldier’ or they undermine distinctions between the sexes as they create a fuzzy new set of genders and gender relations. In this work, I examine each of these possibilities and particularly how technology will affect the activities of war, the gender relations of war and the construct of war itself. I then identify two narratives circulating in the defense and technology communities which describe autonomous or drone technologies in gendered terms, one a narrative of emancipation and the other a restatement of traditional narratives about gender roles and activities.¶ In this way, the questions asked here become part of a broader debate within the technology studies field which asks not what technology does but rather about the ontology of technology itself. Does technology actually contain its own ideology (including gender) which it then realizes and carries out (in this way possessing the agency to cause things to happen) as some internet analysts suggest (Barlow 1996; Cerf 2007)? Or does the ideology and meaning of technology instead derive from the environment in which it is used as those representatives of the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) school claim (Pinch and Bijker 1984)? Or does the ideology and meaning of a technology instead derive from the intents of the designers of the technology or the activities engaged in by those who attempt to use it?¶ The case study presented here shows the limits of the often persuasive arguments which claim that technology can make things happen. In the past, we heard that cable television and CNN helped to bring down the Soviet Union (Goldman 1983), and that Twitter made the Arab Spring (Council on Foreign Relations 2011). Here technology is seen as having both agency and its own ideology either put there by the technology's inventors (i.e., those who invented the internet were libertarians and therefore the internet is a vehicle for realizing freedom [Barlow 1996] rather than an instrument for conducting surveillance [Morozov 2011]) or somehow self-evident in the design of the machine itself (i.e., bicycles and cars are by their nature inappropriate for women; Pinch and Bijker 1984; Manjikian 2012). Indeed military writing on the Revolution in Military Affairs often suggests that technology is driving the train and forcing change in military strategies and tactics, as the military scrambles to keep up with recent advances in communications and electronic warfare (Gray 2004).¶ In this case study, I advance the SCOT perspective, arguing that while autonomous technology might contain the potential to change warfare's meaning, including its gender constructs, it has not done so because military developers and planners in the US have acted to fit the new technology into existing gender stereotypes rather than allowing for the development of new ones.

**Ext. mind-body dualism – Williams**

**Manjikian – drones are a disruption of squo gendered military dyads**

**Tickner**, **92-**[ J. Ann. (1992). (*Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, Engendered Insecurities*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved June 22, 2011 from Columbia International Affairs Online <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner12.html>]- AAA

While the purpose of this book is to introduce gender as a category of analysis into the discipline of international relations, the marginalization of women in the arena of foreign policy-making through the kind of gender stereotyping that I have described suggests that international politics has always been a gendered activity in the modern state system. Since foreign and military policy-making has been largely conducted by men, the discipline that analyzes these activities is bound to be primarily about men and masculinity. We seldom realize we think in these terms, however; in most fields of knowledge we have become accustomed to equating what **is human with what is masculine**. Nowhere is this more true than in international relations, a discipline that, while it has for the most part resisted the introduction of gender into its discourse, bases its assumptions and explanations almost entirely on the activities and experiences of men. Any attempt to introduce a more explicitly gendered analysis into the field must therefore begin with a discussion of masculinity. **Masculinity and politics have a long and close association**. Characteristics associated with "manliness," such as toughness, courage, power, independence, and even physical strength, have, throughout history, been those most valued in the conduct of politics, particularly international politics. Frequently, manliness has also been associated with violence and the use of force, a type of behavior that, when conducted in the international arena, has been valorized and applauded in the name of defending one's country. This **celebration of male power, particularly the glorification of the male warrior, produces more of a gender dichotomy than exists in reality** for, as R. W. Connell points out**, this stereotypical image of masculinity does not fit most men.** Connell suggests that what he calls "hegemonic masculinity," a type of culturally dominant masculinity that he distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is a socially constructed cultural ideal that, while it does not correspond to the actual personality of the majority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order. [6](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/tickner/tickner12.html%20%5C%20note6)Hegemonic **masculinity is sustained through its opposition** to various subordinated and **devalued masculinities**, **such as homosexuality, and, more important, through its** relation to various **devalued femininities**. Socially constructed gender differences are based on socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between men and women that reinforce compliance with men's stated superiority. Nowhere in the public realm are these stereotypical gender images more apparent than in the realm of international politics, where the characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto the behavior of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy.

#### The affirmative’s focus on embodiment as the correct, true method of engaging in politics ignores mental illness as a productive site for critiquing America and causes marginalization of disabled identities.

Donaldson 2002

Elizabeth, Assistant Professor of English and Coordinator of Interdisciplinary Studies at New York Institute of Technology, Old Westbury, “The Corpus of the Madwoman: Toward a Feminist Disability Studies Theory of Embodiment and Mental Illness,” NWSA Journal, Vol 14, No 3, Fall

Nevertheless, I do want to suggest that the enduring importance of¶ medical imaging and madness might be productively linked to what¶ Donna Haraway would call the “tropic” nature of corporealization:¶ “bodies are perfectly ‘real,’ and nothing about corporealization is ‘merely’¶ fiction. But corporealization is tropic and historically specifi c at every¶ layer of its tissues” (1997, 142).18 Though Bertha Rochester is merely fi ction,¶ the system of phrenology and physiognomy in which Jane Eyre participates¶ is part of the corporealization of mad bodies in the nineteenth¶ century. One of the goals of a feminist disability studies theory of mental¶ illness should be to examine these scientific tropes of the mad body. Furthermore,¶ as Haraway suggests, it is possible to accept the “tropic and¶ historically specifi c” nature of corporealization (and of medical language)¶ while simultaneously thinking of bodies (and of mental illness) as real.¶ Beginning to think through mental illness using this notion of corporealization¶ will necessitate a pivotal shift from the model of madness-asrebellion¶ currently in circulation within some women’s studies scholarship,¶ and it will require a more detailed analysis of some of the central¶ terms and concepts of disability studies. More specifi cally, a theory of the¶ corporealization of mental illness demands a closer examination of the¶ relationship between impairment and disability. The distinction between¶ impairment and disability, the material body and the socially-constructed¶ body, has been a crucial one within disability studies. As Lennard Davis¶ explains: “An impairment involves a loss . . . of sight, hearing, mobility,¶ mental ability, and so on. But an impairment only becomes a disability¶ when the ambient society creates environments with barriers—affective,¶ sensory, cognitive, or architectural” (1997, 506–7). What Davis¶ describes here may be termed the impairment-disability system. Like¶ Gayle Rubin’s configuration of the sex-gender system—the process by¶ which biological sex is transformed into cultural gender—the impairment-¶ disability system is the process by which biological impairment¶ is transformed into cultural disability (1975). This confi guration of the¶ impairment-disability system has been particularly useful for people in¶ the disability rights movement, who combat stigma and who protect the¶ civil rights of people with disabilities: by shifting attention away from¶ the biological (impairment) to the social (disability), one can effectively¶ identify and address discrimination. However, while the politically strategic¶ distinction between impairment and disability has been particularly¶ useful, it also has its limits. On one level the impairment-disability¶ system enacts a separation between an accidental, physical body (impairment)¶ and a transcendent, social identity (disability). Within the disability¶ rights movement, the subsequent focus on the social realm privileges¶ the notion of a transcendent civil identity and restricts further discussion¶ about the nature of physical impairment. If impairment occurs in the¶ body and disability occurs in society, then this posits an ideal, disembodied¶ social subject who seems to remain intact, unaltered, even normal,¶ despite physical impairment. The language of the Americans with Disabilities¶ Act of 1990 evokes this false ideal: the subject (American) is the¶ seemingly stable core that exists independently from the accidental body¶ (with Disabilities). However, the impairments of severe mental illness¶ challenge the normalizing logic of this model. Using a wheelchair does¶ not disrupt the notion of American quite so much as being delusional¶ does. For example, although the physical barriers that exist for wheelchair¶ users are very real and pervasive, they are quite different in nature¶ from mental competency requirements that restrict the abstract right to¶ vote or to refuse medication.

**This focus on the body, combined with their association of “Vision” with power, recreates violent ableist stereotypes that oppresses those whose bodies do not meet these preconceived notions.**

**Cherney 2011** – Wayne State University (“The Rhetoric Of Ableism.” Disabilities study quarterly,  [Vol 31, No 3 (2011)](http://dsq-sds.org/index.php/dsq/issue/view/84) <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606#endnoteref01>)

Finally, focusing on ableism as rhetoric makes rhetorical responses more attractive. Political rhetoric seems much less empty when one understands that the problems confronted are also rhetorical in nature. The problem is not that deviance is bad, it is that ableism teaches seeing it that way. The problem is not that being abnormal is unnatural, it is that ableism teaches valuing normalcy that way. The problem is not that ability resides in the body, and that a body with different skills is inherently unable to function in society, it is that ableism teaches knowing ability that way. Confronting ableism as visual, ideological, and epistemic problems does not require us to set aside efforts to change the material order of society—such as working to provide access to public spaces—but it does empower disability literature, art, slogans, and protests as crucial to the effort to change what disability means. If we locate the problem in disability, then the ableist absolves his or her responsibility for discrimination and may not even recognize its presence. If we locate the problem in ableism, then the ableist must question her or his orientation. The critic's task is to make ableism so apparent and irredeemable that **one cannot practice it without incurring social castigation**. This **requires substantial vigilance**, for ableist thinking pervades the culture. For example, as I write this, I am tempted to use medical metaphors to explain the task and script something like "we cannot simply excise the tumor of ableism and heal the culture, for it has metastasized and infiltrated every organ of society." Yet this metaphor relies on an ableist perspective that motivates with the fear of death and turns to medical solutions to repair a body in decay. Using it, I would endorse and perpetuate ableist rhetoric, just as I would by using deafness as a metaphor for obstinacy ("Marie was deaf to their pleas for bread") or blindness to convey ignorance ("George turned a blind eye to global warming"). The pervasiveness of these and similar metaphors, like the cultural ubiquity of using images of disabled bodies to inspire pity, suggest the scale of the work ahead, and the ease with which one can resort to using them warns of the need for critical evaluation of one's own rhetoric**. Yet the task can be accomplished**. Just as feminists have changed Western culture by naming and promoting recognition of sexism, the glass ceiling, and patriarchy—admittedly a work in progress, yet also one that can celebrate remarkable achievements—we can reform ableist culture by using rhetoric to craft awareness and political action.

**Language and rejecting in this debate are key**

**Cherney 2011** – Wayne State University (“The Rhetoric Of Ableism.” Disabilities study quarterly,  [Vol 31, No 3 (2011)](http://dsq-sds.org/index.php/dsq/issue/view/84) <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606#endnoteref01>) CMR

In this essay I analyze ableism as a *rhetorical* problem for three reasons. First, ableist culture sustains and perpetuates itself via rhetoric; the ways of interpreting disability and assumptions about bodies that produce ableism are learned. The previous generation teaches it to the next and cultures spread it to each other through modes of intercultural exchange. Adopting a rhetorical perspective to the problem of ableism thus exposes the social systems that keep it alive. This informs my second reason for viewing ableism as rhetoric, as revealing how it thrives suggests ways of curtailing its growth and promoting its demise. Many of the strategies already adopted by disability rights activists to confront ableism explicitly or implicitly address it as rhetoric. Public demonstrations, countercultural performances, autobiography, transformative histories of disability and disabling practices, and critiques of ableist films and novels all apply rhetorical solutions to the problem. Identifying ableism as rhetoric and exploring its systems dynamic reveals how these corrective practices work. We can use such information to refine the successful techniques, reinvent those that fail, and realize new tactics. Third, I contend that any means of challenging ableism must eventually encounter its rhetorical power. As I explain below, ableism is that **most insidious form of rhetoric** that has become reified and so widely accepted as common sense that it denies its own rhetoricity—it "*goes without saying*." **To fully address it we must name its presence**, for cultural assumptions accepted uncritically adopt the mantle of "simple truth" and become extremely difficult to rebut. As the neologism "ableism" itself testifies, we need new words to reveal the places it resides and new language to describe how it feeds. Without doing so, ableist ways of thinking and interpreting will operate as the context for making sense of any acts challenging discrimination, which undermines their impact, reduces their symbolic potential, and can even transform them into superficial measures that give the appearance of change yet elide a recalcitrant ableist system.

#### **Still matters – even if the 1AC is only guilty of not making reference to those who do not fit in their methodology, that is a deliberate act of discursive exclusion by silencing voices**

Medina 11 – prof @ Vanderbilt

(Jose, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, Foucault Studies, No. 12, pp. 9-35, October 2011)

In the second place, by undoing established historical continuities, a counter- history reflects and produces discontinuous moments in a people’s past, gaps that are passed over in silence, interstices in the socio-historical fabric of a community that have received no attention. This is what we can call, by symmetry with the pre- vious point, the principle of discontinuity. Foucault describes it in the following way:¶ This counter-history “also breaks the continuity of glory.” It reveals that the light—the famous dazzling effect of power—is not something that petrifies, solidifies, and immobilizes the entire social body, and thus keeps it in order; it is in fact a divisive light that illuminates one side of the social body but leaves the other side in shadow or casts it into darkness.13¶ A counter-history is the dark history of those peoples who have been kept in the shadows, a history that speaks ‚from within the shadows,‛ ‚the discourse of those who have no glory, or of those who have lost it and who now find themselves, perhaps for a time—but probably for a long time—in darkness and silence.‛14 A counter-his- tory is not the history of victories, but the history of defeats. As Foucault remarks, it is linked to those ‚epic, religious, or mythical forms which “formulate the misfortune of ancestors, exiles, and servitude;‛ it ‚is much closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans.‛15 While an official history keeps entire groups of peoples and their lives and experiences ‚in darkness and silence,‛ a counter-history teaches us precisely how to listen to those silent and dark moments. But how do we learn to listen to silence? In an earlier essay, ‚What is an Author?,‛16 Foucault offers helpful remarks about how to fight against the ‘omissions‛ and active oblivion produced by discursive practices, that is, how to listen to lost voices that have been silenced or coopted in such a way that certain meanings were lost or never heard. Foucault is particularly interested in those forms of silencing produced by a discursive practice which, far from being accidental, are in fact foundational and constitutive. Those are constitutive silences, for the discursive practice proceeds in the way it does and acquires its distinctive normative structure by virtue of the exclusions that it produces, by virtue of those silenced voices and occluded meanings that let the official voices and meanings dominate the discursive space. Omissions and silences are foundational, a constitutive part of ‚the origin‛ or ‚the initiation‛ of a discursive practice. For that reason, the fight against those exclusions requires ‚a return to the origin‛:¶ If we return, it is because of a basic and constructive omission that is not the result of accident or incomprehension.” This non-accidental omission must be regulated by precise operations that can be situated, analyzed, and reduced in a return to the act of initiation.17¶ Foucault distinguishes this critical ‚return to the origin‛ from mere ‚rediscoveries‛ and mere ‚reactivations‛: a rediscovery promotes ‚the perception of forgotten or obscured figures;‛18 and a reactivation involves ‚the insertion of discourse into totally new domains of generalization, practices, and transformation.‛19 By contrast, an attempt to transform a discursive practice deeply from the inside by resisting its silences and omissions requires a ‚return to the origin.‛ This critical return involves revisiting the texts that have come to be considered foundational, ‚the primary points of reference‛ of the practice, and developing a new way of reading them, so as to train our eyes and ears to new meanings and voices: we pay ‚particular attention to those things registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading plenitude.‛20 Foucault emphasizes that the modifications introduced by this critical return to the origin are not merely ‚a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and re- double it in the form of an ornament which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice.‛21 If rediscoveries and reactivations of the past are crucial for extending discursive practices, a ‚return to the origin‛ that unveils omissions and silences is what is required for a deep transformation of our meaning-making capacities within those practices. The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences, to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frame- works. Lacking that ability is a strong indication of one’s inability to resist epistemic and socio-political subjugation, of the limitations on one’s agency and positionality within discursive practices. And the ability to inhabit discursive practices critically that we develop by becoming sensitive to exclusions—by listening to silences— enables us not to be trapped into discursive practices, that is, it gives us also the ability to develop counter-discourses. Indeed, being able to negotiate historical narratives and to resist imposed interpretations of one’s past means being able to develop counter-histories. Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledge: it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices of those peoples who have lived their life ‚in darkness and silence.‛

# 1NR

## Case

### AT: Disembodied Knowledge

**The hair on the back of his neck stands up**

**Mirrors into the lives – they get the situational access**

**See the vulnerabilities of the individuals**

**Drone operators are closer than any others – they see the effects and the aftermath**

**Establishes a moral view and empathy**

**--** Coeckelbergh

**Drone operators see everything**

**And the aftermath, watch the victims bleed out, more personal**

**-- Leo**

**And it’s not just staring at a screen, higher rates of PTSD and the sense of proximity makes the experience real**

Drones are psychologically destructive. Claims that there is a technological separation ignore the living hell of drone operators.

Power 10/23

(Matthew, “Confessions of a Drone Warrior” http://www.gq.com/news-politics/big-issues/201311/drone-uav-pilot-assassination?currentPage=1)

“After that first missile hit, I didn’t really talk to anyone for a couple weeks.” Bryant spoke to me while driving his beat-up black Dodge Neon in looping cursive circles around his hometown of Missoula. A yellow support-the-troops sticker on his bumper was obscured by a haze of road salt. The car’s interior was festooned with patches from the different units he’d served with; in the back seat was a military pack stuffed with equal parts dirty laundry and bug-out gear. The gray midwinter sky weighed on a procession of strip malls and big-box stores; the snowy crenellations of the Bitterroot Range stretched far away to the south. He stared ahead as though watching the scene of his shot on an endless loop. “I didn’t know what it meant to kill someone. And watching the aftermath, watching someone bleed out, because of something that I did?” That night, on the drive home, he’d started sobbing. He pulled over and called his mother. “She just was like, ‘Everything will be okay,’ and I told her I killed someone, I killed people, and I don’t feel good about it. And she’s like, ‘Good, that’s how it should feel, you should never not feel that way.’ ” Other members of his squadron had different reactions to their work. One sensor operator, whenever he made a kill, went home and chugged an entire bottle of whiskey. A female operator, after her first shot, refused to fire again even under the threat of court martial. Another pilot had nightmares after watching two headless bodies float down the Tigris. Bryant himself would have bizarre dreams where the characters from his favorite game, World of Warcraft, appeared in infrared. By mid-2011, Bryant was back in Missoula, only now he felt angry, isolated, depressed. While getting a video game at a Best Buy, he showed his military ID with his credit card, and a teenage kid behind him in line spoke up. “He’s like, ‘Oh, you’re in the military; my brother, he’s a Marine, he’s killed like thirty-six dudes, and he tells me about it all the time.’ And I turn around and say, ‘If you fucking ever talk like this to me again, I will stab you. Don’t ever disrespect people’s deaths like that ever again.’ ” The kid went pale, and Bryant took his game and left. At the urging of a Vietnam veteran he met at the local VA office, Bryant finally went to see a therapist. After a few sessions, he just broke down: “I told her I wanted to be a hero, but I don’t feel like a hero. I wanted to do something good, but I feel like I just wasted the last six years of my life.” She diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder. It was an unexpected diagnosis. For decades the model for understanding PTSD has been “fear conditioning”: quite literally the lasting psychological ramifications of mortal terror. But a term now gaining wider acceptance is “moral injury.” It represents a tectonic realignment, a shift from a focusing on the violence that has been done to a person in wartime toward his feelings about what he has done to others—or what he’s failed to do for them. The concept is attributed to the clinical psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, who in his book Achilles in Vietnam traces the idea back as far as the Trojan War. The mechanisms of death may change—as intimate as a bayonet or as removed as a Hellfire—but the bloody facts, and their weight on the human conscience, remain the same. Bryant’s diagnosis of PTSD fits neatly into this new understanding. It certainly made sense to Bryant. “I really have no fear,” he says now. “It’s more like I’ve had a soul-crushing experience. An experience that I thought I’d never have. I was never prepared to take a life.” In 2011, Air Force psychologists completed a mental-health survey of 600 combat drone operators. Forty-two percent of drone crews reported moderate to high stress, and 20 percent reported emotional exhaustion or burnout. The study’s authors attributed their dire results, in part, to “existential conflict.” A later study found that drone operators suffered from the same levels of depression, anxiety, PTSD, alcohol abuse, and suicidal ideation as traditional combat aircrews. These effects appeared to spike at the exact time of Bryant’s deployment, during the surge in Iraq. (Chillingly, to mitigate these effects, researchers have proposed creating a Siri-like user interface, a virtual copilot that anthropomorphizes the drone and lets crews shunt off the blame for whatever happens. Siri, have those people killed.)

### AT: View from Nowhere

#### Drones are not a “view from nowhere” – the surveillance creates an epistemic and moral bridge to people that makes killing more difficult than the alternatives

Coeckelbergh 2013

Mark, Philosophy Professor at the University of Twente in the Netherlands and managing director of the 3TU Centre for Ethics and Technology, Ph.D. from University of Birmingham; “Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting,” Ethics and Information Technology, Vol 15, Iss 2, June

Let me further develop this argument. There is a real¶ possibility that empathic bridging happens since surveillance¶ of (potential) targets takes up much of the time of¶ the ‘crews’ in the control room. The actual killing is only¶ a small part of what they do; usually they watch¶ (potential) targets. In addition, it would be wrong to¶ understand the epistemic relation between drone crews¶ and their opponents as purely ‘technical’ or as mere¶ consisting of (passively) ‘watching’ screens. People do¶ not perceive the world in a passive and ‘neutral’ way.¶ What they see on the ground is never entirely ‘objective’.¶ Perception is active; there is always interpretation: the¶ interpretation communicated to them by their commanders,¶ but also personal interpretation. The military practice¶ leaves room for, and makes possible, active interpretation,¶ in particular the construction of narrative. People make¶ up stories about the people they monitor. Time renders¶ this possible. As said, drone crews have time for that;¶ they spend a lot of time on keeping an eye on particular¶ people.¶ Drones can engage in ‘‘persistent surveillance’’. That¶ means they don’t just swoop in, fire missiles and¶ swoop out; they may spend hours, days, or even¶ months monitoring a particular target. [Drones are]¶ equipped with imaging technologies that enable¶ operators even thousands of miles away to see details¶ as fine as individual faces […]. (Brooks 2012)¶ How easy is it to kill people you came to know in this way,¶ if you have seen their face? Did not that ‘target’ become¶ more of a person? Did not the appearance of the opponent¶ and interpretation of his status shift? Once the drone¶ operator gains ‘a certain intimacy’ (Bumiller 2012) with¶ the lives of the people on the ground (this is what pilots¶ operating in Afghanistan reported), he sees that the people¶ he is supposed to kill are similar to himself. They also have¶ families, they also ‘wake up in the morning, do their work,¶ go to sleep at night’ (an Air Force major quoted in Bumiller¶ 2012). And if drone crews see the suffering of persons they¶ inflict, their fighting can no longer entirely be compared to¶ a video game; it is not even the same as firing a missile¶ from an airplane in which you are present. Lieutentant¶ Colonel Mike Weaver, a veteran F15 fighter pilot says:¶ ‘I’ve flown manned aircraft and believe me this, in terms of¶ combat, is more up close and personal.’ (Weaver quoted in¶ Caroll 2012). Drone operators explicitly dismiss the¶ suggestion that they are playing a video game (Bumiller¶ 2012), and it seems they do so for good reasons. A CIA¶ drone operator told a journalist:¶ I dropped bombs, hit my target load, but had no idea¶ who I hit. [With drones], I can look at their faces…¶ see these guys playing with their kids and wives…¶ After the strike, I see the bodies being carried out of¶ the house. I see the women weeping and in positions¶ of mourning. That’s not PlayStation; that’s real.¶ (drone operator quoted in Brooks 2012)¶ For the drone operator, the ‘reality’ of the situation is¶ constructed in terms of the suffering and death on the¶ ground and the relation between his actions and that¶ suffering and death. He knows it is real because he sees¶ what happens to the people and thus knows that his actions¶ make a difference between life and death. Or in the words¶ of a pilot who used to fly missions from an air force base¶ outside Las Vegas: ‘There’s no video game in the world¶ that makes the difference between life and death (pilot¶ Chad quoted in Caroll 2012). This puts a heavy load of¶ moral responsibility on the shoulders of these people and¶ those who order them to kill. Again: it does not render¶ killing easy, but rather the very opposite.

#### Drone usage involves reflective agents, not a view from nowhere

Coeckelbergh 2013

Mark, Philosophy Professor at the University of Twente in the Netherlands and managing director of the 3TU Centre for Ethics and Technology, Ph.D. from University of Birmingham; “Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting,” Ethics and Information Technology, Vol 15, Iss 2, June

Second, I have shown that the moral-epistemic distancing¶ effects of the teletechnologies are somewhat mitigated¶ by surveillance technologies used by the drone¶ crews, which, although they are at the same time teletechnologies,¶ also make it possible that people re-personalize¶ and ‘re-face’ their opponents by monitoring what they¶ do, by constructing narratives, by imagining their lives.¶ Surveillance technologies create the possibility of empathic¶ bridging. In so far as they bring back a kind of knowledge¶ of the opponent that confirms rather than denies his¶ humanity, personality, embodiment, and vulnerability,¶ recent drone-fighting technologies make it less, not more¶ easy to kill. This can be regarded as a kind of ‘mutation’ or¶ non-intended ‘hacking’ of the practice, twisting its very¶ purpose (or so it seems). This is a problem for those who¶ order the pilots to kill (military commanders but also some¶ politicians) and for those who think that fighting should be¶ all about killing. For others it is a hope-giving observation¶ that shows the ‘human’ side of a practice often described in¶ terms of ‘killing machines’ or ‘killer robots’: as long as¶ there are human pilots and reconnaissance people in the¶ loop, it is not a matter of mindless action and mindless¶ killing; there is killing, but there is also interpretation,¶ empathy, narration. People involved in the practice also¶ ‘re-think aspects of their life’: they are active hermeneutical¶ and reflective agents

**Creates ethical hacking – brings responsibility without killing**

#### The surveillance component of drones is key to ‘ethical hacking’ that subverts drones into anti-killing machines

Coeckelbergh 13

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### Tradeoff

#### Drones tradeoff with troops –

#### Either an inclusion of situated knowledge doesn’t change the practices of those that are in control of the weapons, which means they can’t solve, because the incorporation of situated knowledge does not have a point for the debate, or they link, jacobstein evidence says that there’s a tradeoff

**Troops are worse – no way to gain situated knowledge because it is a hypothetical so closest we can get is objective – kill more people,**

#### Response to drones versus the Pakistani army proves they’re the best option

Foust 2012 - fellow at the American Security Project (September 26, Joshua, “Targeted Killing, Pro and Con: What to Make of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/targeted-killing-pro-and-con-what-to-make-of-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/262862/>)

It is not a simple one to answer. Looking at how residents in the FATA have behaved in other violent campaigns is instructive. In early 2009, the Pakistani Army announced its campaign to "clear" the Swat Valley, north of Islamabad, of terrorist groups that had been systematically murdering elders and tribal policemen and destroying hundreds of schools and other government buildings. As the campaign proceeded, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said more than 300,000 people fled the fighting. By the end of the campaign, more than 1 million people got displaced by the army-Taliban fighting in Swat, which left the region completely devastated. There have been no reported mass movements of people fleeing the drones in the last four years. The mere threat of a Pakistani army offensive into Waziristan, however, prompts thousands to flee in terror. There are several possible explanations: for example, people in heavily affected drone areas might be terrified to leave their houses. But there is a simpler explanation: Perhaps drones are not as scary as opponents claim. A February investigation by the Associated Press -- which, unlike the Living Under Drones study, interviewed Pakistanis inside the FATA -- reported that civilian casualties from drones are far lower than Pakistan civil society figures, journalists, and party officials assert publicly. This calls into question the wisdom of relying on such interested parties to build a picture of the utility and morality of targeted killings in Pakistan. Furthermore, the Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP), a Pakistan-based research group, consistently finds in its surveys within the FATA that the most pressing security fear among residents is bomb blasts by terror groups, followed closely by the Pakistani military. When asked open-ended questions about their greatest fears, very few ever mention drones. That's not to say people love drones. Many constituencies in the rest of the country are strongly opposed to the drone campaign. But both terror groups and the Pakistani military kill far more innocent civilians and leave far more physical devastation in their wake -- what is the "least bad" course for policymakers? In the short run, there aren't better choices than drones. The targets of drone strikes in Pakistan sponsor insurgents in the region that kill U.S. soldiers and destabilize the Pakistani state (that is why Pakistani officials demand greater control over targeting). They cannot simply be left alone to continue such violent attacks. And given the Pakistani government's reluctance either to grant the FATA the political inclusion necessary for normal governance or to establish an effective police force (right now it has neither), there is no writ of the state to impose order and establish the rule of law. Drones represent the choice with the smallest set of drawbacks and adverse consequences. Reports like Living Under Drones highlight the need for both more transparency from the US and Pakistani governments, and for drawing attention to the social backlash against their use in Pakistan. But they do not definitively build a case against drones in general. Without a better alternative, drones are here to stay.

#### **Drones have the least civilian casualties – other numbers are inflated.**

**On the ground efforts – which is a form of situational knowledge**

**byman**

Byman 13 Professor in Security Studies @ Georgetown

#### **Drones minimize civilian casualties – most precise weapons.**

Jacobson 13, Senior Defense Fellow @ German Marshall Fund of U.S.

(Mark R. Jacobson, NATO International Security Assistance Force, ex-DOD, ex- Scholar for International Security and Public Policy @ OSU, PhD in Military History and Strategic Studies from OSU, “Five myths about Obama’s drone war”, 2/8/13, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-08/opinions/36988550\_1\_drone-strikes-drone-pilots-civilian-casualties)

Armed drones are some of the most precise weapons used in conflict; we hit what we aim for. But any lethal force results in some civilian casualties, and the use of drones beyond “hot battlefields” means that the civilian-combatant distinction is harder to make.¶ The New York Times has reported that the Obama administration counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants — an approach that would underreport civilian casualties. But the New America Foundation’s Peter Bergen argues that, since 2008, the civilian casualty rate from drones has declined dramatically and as of last summer was “at or close to zero.”¶ While many dispute this figure, civilian casualties in drone strikes are clearly fewer than if massive bombs were used instead.